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Do Expectations Play Any Role in Determining 
Pak Rupee Exchange Rates? 
RAZZAQUE H. BHATTI 
 
This paper presents some evidence on the role of expectations in the determination of 
Pak rupee exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar, pound, and yen over the period 1982:1–
1993:7. Results of cointegration and coefficient restriction tests in two out of three cases are 
supportive of the view of exchange rate determination in postulating that in efficient markets 
in which uncertainty and expectations about the future are dominant, the equilibrium 
nominal exchange rate is determined not only by current relative prices but also by the 
expected real exchange rate. These results are supportive of ex ante purchasing power 
parity, implying that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. These results also 
suggest that the anticipated inflation rate is higher in Pakistan than in other countries, which 
tends to encourage the domestic residents to convert their current balances into foreign 
currency, so that the terms of trade deteriorate and offset much of gains of the continuous 
devaluation of Pak rupee by undermining external competitiveness. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of floating exchange rates by major industrial countries in 
1973, there has been an increased interest in analysing the process of exchange rate 
determination. As the earliest formal explanation of exchange rate determination, the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) theory has emerged as a natural starting-point from 
which to investigate economic fundamentals underlying the process of exchange rate 
behaviour.1 The PPP theory, which was originally put forward by Cassel (1916), 
postulates that under a system of floating exchange rates, so long as trade is free and 
transportation costs, capital flows, and speculative expectations are absent, the 
nominal exchange rate between two national currencies tends to be essentially in line 
with the ratio of the domestic price level to the foreign price level, and the real 
exchange rate to be the mean reverting over time. 
However, most studies dealing with the empirical testing of PPP have 
documented evidence that usually indicates the failure of the theory.2 One reason for 
the failure of PPP, as suggested by Roll (1979) and Adler and Lehman (1983), is that 
Razzaque H. Bhatti is Associate Professor of Economics at the International Institute of Islamic 
Economics, International Islamic University, Islamabad. 
1While PPP may be considered as a theory of inflation under fixed exchange rates, it is just an 
equilibrium condition under flexible exchange rates. Under fixed exchange rates, PPP implies that 
inflation rates, subject to certain reservations, must be equal in all countries of an integrated world 
economy [see, for example, Genberg (1978)]. 
2See, inter alia, Frenkel (1981); Taylor (1988); Patel (1990); Nachane and Chrissanthaki (1991); 
Crowder (1992); Flynn and Boucher (1993); Cooper (1994); Serletis (1994) and Moosa and Bhatti (1996). 
For a detailed and comprehensive survey of PPP, see also Moosa and Bhatti (1997a). 
Razzaque H. Bhatti 264 
efficient markets competition among speculators tends to establish PPP on ex ante 
basis, so that expected changes in the real exchange rate are serially uncorrelated 
over time, indicating that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. This implies 
that there is no theoretical reason for the real exchange rate to reach some constant 
value. Therefore, results supportive of ex ante PPP can be interpreted as implying the 
reason why conventional PPP fails to perform well empirically. Bhatti and Moosa 
(1994) view the failure of conventional PPP in a different perspective. They argue 
that conventional PPP fails to perform well over the current flexible exchange rate 
regime because it neglects the role of uncertainty and expectations in exchange rate 
determination. Based on ex ante PPP, they put forward a new view of exchange rate 
determination which postulates that in efficient markets in which there is presence of 
uncertainty and expectations about the future, the exchange rate is determined not 
only by current relative prices but also by the expected real exchange rate.3 
The objective of this paper4 is to test the validity of this view of exchange rate 
determination for three Pak rupee exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar, pound, and yen 
over the period 1982:1–1993:7.5 The testing technique will be cointegration analysis 
because it provides an especially suitable framework for evaluating long-run 
relationships while allowing for short-run deviations. Cointegration analysis is 
superior to conventional regression analysis for at least two reasons. First, it 
produces superconsistent estimates of the regression parameters, despite the presence 
of such problems as simultaneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity [Stock 
(1987)]. Second, making inferences about the numerical values of the estimated 
coefficients of the non-stationary regressors on the basis of the conventional standard 
errors and t-statistics is erroneous because they do not have limiting normal 
distribution [Engle and Granger (1991)]. However, in cointegration analysis the t-
statistics calculated from the OLS standard errors can be corrected along the lines 
suggested by West (1988) in order to give them a limiting normal distribution. 
3In fact, uncertainty about future prices is a central feature of the efficient markets paradigm [see 
Roll (1979), p. 137]. 
4An earlier version of this paper was presented at the National Conference on Business 
Administration and Economics, held at IBA, Karachi, May 20–22, 1996. 
5One reason for picking out Pak rupee exchange rates for this period is that the authorities have 
never been formally committed to defending a specific exchange rate since they opted for a managed float 
in April 1982: instead, they allowed the exchange rate to move to its new equilibrium value when they 
wanted it to change and entered the market to keep the rate constant when they did not. This does not 
follow that one cannot test both forms of PPP for fixed exchange rates. It is important, however, to 
determine the direction of normalisation while testing the former hypothesis for fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. Researchers usually normalise the conventional PPP model on nominal exchange rates if 
exchange rates are flexible, and on domestic prices if exchange rates are fixed. The significance of 
choosing different directions of normalisation is that PPP can be used as an explanation of the 
transmission mechanism of world inflation and movements in exchange rates [see, for example, Moosa 
and Bhatti (1997a), pp. 202–204]. As for the ex ante PPP hypothesis, it can be tested both for flexible and 
fixed exchange rates. However, empirical results may produce more pronounced rejections of the 
hypothesis in the latter case than in the former [see Adler and Lehman (1983), p. 1477]. 
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II.  THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS 
An important assumption underlying ex ante PPP is that market agents are 
uncertain about future movements in prices and exchange rates and, as a result, they 
are more concerned with the expected (than with the current) purchasing power of 
their return on investment, domestic and foreign. For example, if the future inflation 
rate is expected to be higher at home than abroad, domestic market agents will find it 
worthwhile to convert their current balances into foreign currency in anticipation of 
gains from depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic (foreign) currency. Therefore, 
if the nominal exchange rate moves to equalise the expected domestic and foreign 
inflation rates, then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is not only determined by 
current relative prices but also by the expected real exchange rate. This implies that 
the country with relatively high expected inflation rate will have an undervalued 
currency based on current purchasing power, while the country with relatively low 
expected inflation rate will have an overvalued currency. Consequently, the terms of 
trade will improve for the latter and deteriorate for the former. Moreover, this 
implies that while devaluation improves external competitiveness, the larger 
expected inflation rate at home (than that abroad) will eventually offset much of its 
gains by undermining external competitiveness. 
Ex ante PPP postulates that the expected rate of change in the nominal 
exchange rate tends to be exactly equal to the expected differential in inflation rates 









+++ ∆−∆=∆ 111  … … … … … (1) 
 
where ∆ is the difference operator, st is (the logarithm of) the nominal exchange rate 
(defined as the domestic currency price of one unit of the foreign currency), pt ( ∗tp ) 
is (the logarithm of) the domestic (foreign) price level, and the superscript e indicates 
the value of the variable expected at time t to prevail at time t+1.  
Equation (1) may be derived by assuming either efficiency in international 
financial markets or efficiency in international commodity markets. Efficiency in 
international commodity markets obtains when the expected return to speculators 
engaged in intertemporal speculation on commodities (i.e., buying a domestic 
commodity today and selling it abroad tomorrow) is equal to zero. An implicit 
assumption underlying conventional PPP is that market agents are certain about the 
future and compete with each other on arbitrage profit opportunities arising out of 
differences between the domestic prices and the exchange-rate-adjusted foreign 
prices of goods. This arbitrage condition boils down to the PPP equation which can 
be written as 
 
∗−= ttt pps  … … … … … … (2) 
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If transportation costs and trade barriers are absent, Equation (2) implies that 
deviations from parity indicate the existence of profitable opportunities for 
commodity arbitrage. Deviations from PPP imply that the same good, after adjusting 
for the exchange rate, will sell at different prices between home and abroad. 
Simultaneously buying the good in the low-price country and selling the good in the 
high-price country will force the nominal exchange rate to PPP and the real exchange 
rate to some constant value. Therefore, conventional PPP requires the return to 
speculators engaged in temporal speculation on goods, buying goods at home at the 
domestic price, pt, and selling them abroad at the exchange-rate-adjusted foreign 
price, ∗+ tt ps , to be equal to zero. 
In empirically testable form, conventional PPP can be written as follows 
 
st = α0 + α1 (p – p*)t + ut … … … … … (3) 
 
Clearly ex ante PPP differs from conventional PPP because market agents are 
assumed to be uncertain about future movements in prices and exchange rates, and 
because they form expectations about future exchange rates and prices. Therefore, 
unlike the conventional PPP market, agents in ex ante PPP are assumed to lose out 
on arbitrage profit opportunities arising out of the differences not only between the 
current but also between the expected prices of domestic and foreign goods. In other 
words, ex ante PPP requires that not only the return to speculators engaged in 
temporal speculation on goods but also the return to speculators engaged in 
intertemporal speculation on goods be equal to zero. Suppose, if transaction costs are 
absent, then the return to speculators engaged in temporal speculation on goods is 
given by 
 
tttt pps −+=π ∗  … … … … … (3a) 
 
where πt (representing the real exchange rate) is the profit which is made by 
speculator by buying goods at home and selling them abroad. On the other hand, the 
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where et 1+π also represents the expected real exchange rate. Thus, the net return from 
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∗
+++ ∆−∆+∆=π−π  … … … … (5) 
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If markets are efficient in Fama’s (1970) sense, then today prices must reflect all 
information available to agents, so that current prices are the best forecast of future 
prices. Therefore, tt
e
t ω=π−π +1 where the error term, ωt, is completely random, 
displaying no pattern over time, Equation (5) reduces to Equation (1), which can be 











∗ +−+−=  … … … (6) 
 
This implies that the nominal exchange rate is not only determined by current 
relative prices but also by the expected real exchange rate, implying also that the 
omission of the latter makes the conventional PPP model misspecified. 




tt uqpps +β+−β+β= +∗ 1210 )(  … … … … (7) 
 










++++ +−= 1111 ). If 
expectations play any role in determining the exchange rate, than β2 should be 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, the restrictions β0 = 0, β1 = 1 and β2 = 1 
can also be tested to examine if the nominal exchange rate moves in one-to-one 
correspondence with the relative price and expected real exchange rate. 
It is worth noting that Equation (7) cannot be tested empirically unless the 
expected real exchange rate is quantified. For this purpose, let us assume that market 
agents across countries are able to form expectations rationally, such that the actual 
(ex post) real exchange rate realised at time t + 1 differs from the expected real 
exchange rate by a random error which is orthogonal to the past real exchange rate. 
Therefore, 
 
111 +++ += tett vqq  … … … … … (8) 
 
where vt+1 is a zero-mean serially uncorrelated real exchange rate forecasting error. 
By substituting Equation (7) into Equation (8), we obtain 
 
tttt qpps ε+β+−β+β= +∗ 1210 )(  … … … … (9) 
 
where εt = ut – β2vt+1. Equation (9) forms the basis of testing ex ante PPP [see Bhatti 
and Moosa (1994)].6 
6Ex ante PPP can also be tested using other model specifications. For a brief summary of these 
alternative approaches to testing ex ante PPP, see Bhatti and Moosa (1994), p. 149. 
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III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Testing the proposition as to whether or not expectations play any role in the 
determination of exchange rate is carried out by estimating Equation (9). For this 
purpose, monthly data were collected on three exchange rates—rupee-dollar, rupee-
pound, and rupee-yen—and on wholesale prices over the period 1982:1–1993:7. All 
data were obtained from Datastream (IMF series). 
Before testing for cointegration, unit root tests are carried out to examine if 
the variables underlying Equation (9) are integrated of the same order. Testing for 
unit root in levels and first differences of the variables st, (p – p*)t and qt+1 is 
conducted on the basis of three tests statistics: the Dickey-Fuller (1979) τµ statistics 
and the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) aZˆ and tZˆ statistics. The results obtained from the 
three unit-root test statistics, as shown in Table 1, are consistent in indicating that all 
the variables underlying Equation (9) are non-stationary in levels and stationary in 
first differences, implying that they are I(1).7 
 
Table 1 
Testing for Unit Root 
Level First Difference 
Country Variable τµ aZˆ  tZˆ  τµ aZˆ  tZˆ  
Pak-U.S. st –0.877 –0.720 –0.843 –7.626* –98.27* –7.109* 
 qt+1 –2.171 –8.977 –2.328 –9.378* –11.06* –9.018* 
 (p – p*)t 0.230 0.285 0.625 –8.797* –74.02* –9.641* 
Pak-Japan st 0.074 –0.024 –0.029 –10.957* –150.97* –11.208* 
 qt+1 0.619 –0.889 –0.536 –11.766* –134.88* –11.854* 
 (p – p*)t 0.775 0.231 0.562 –9.937* –114.73* –9.771* 
Pak-U.K. st –0.495 –0.526 –0.430 –10.708* –108.58* –10.754* 
 qt+1 –1.010 –1.736 –0.968 –10.572* –105.00* –10.583* 
 (p – p*)t 0.726 1.135 1.272 –5.573* –66.21* –8.312* 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
Testing for cointegration is conducted on the basis of the Engle-Granger 
(1987) and the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) procedures. Two test statistics are used in 
conjunction with each cointegration test: while ADF and CRDW statistics are used 
with the Engle-Granger test, aZˆ and tZˆ statistics are used with the Phillips-Ouliaris 
test. Results of cointegration and coefficient restrictions tests are reported in Table 2. 
The  results  from  four  cointegration  test  statistics, CRDW, ADF, aZˆ and tZˆ , are  
7Today there is ample evidence showing that most of the macroeconomic time series are non-
stationary, including the ratio of the domestic price index to the foreign price index. The unit-root results 
of this study are perfectly compatible with those of bulk of studies carried out, inter alia, by Taylor 
(1988); Patel (1990); Flynn and Boucher (1993); Cooper (1994); Bhatti and Moosa (1994) and Moosa and 
Bhatti (1997). 
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Table 2 
Testing for Cointegration (st = β0 + β1 (p – p*)t + β2qt+1 + εt) 



















R2 0.995 0.996 0.987 
CRDW 1.426* 1.797* 1.797* 
ADF –8.920* –10.521* –10.521* 
aZˆ  –103.65* –104.035* –104.487* 
tZˆ  –8.51* –10.487* –10.487* 
t* (β0 = 0) 0.971 1.96 2.85* 
t* (β1 = 1) 1.00 1.67 2.89* 
t* (β2 = 0) 25.32* 24.40* 25.11* 
t* (β2 = 1) –1.00 –1.92 –2.95* 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. The West-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
t* is the corrected t-statistic which is calculated on the basis of the corrected standard errors. 
 
highly consistent in lending support to the role of expectations in determining Pak 
rupee exchange rates because the coefficient on the expected real exchange rate is 
highly significant in all cases. However, the results are not supportive of the 
hypothesis that the nominal exchange rate moves in one-to-one correspondence with 
the relative price, and expected real exchange rate in all cases. Only in two cases 
(rupee-dollar and rupee-yen) are the restrictions β0 = 0, β1 = 1, β2 = 1 accepted as 
judged by the West (1988) corrected t-statistic. These results lend strong support to 
ex ante PPP predicting that the real exchange rate follows a random walk, and also to 
the view postulating that the nominal exchange is determined not only by current 
relative prices but also by the expected real exchange rate. Moreover, these results 
are highly consistent with those obtained by Bhatti and Moosa (1994), who tested the 
validity of this view for ten major industrial countries and found favourable results in 
almost all cases. 
These results may not, however, be interpreted as implying that the authorities 
in Pakistan have been able to choose nominal values of Pak rupee exchange rates in 
line with their economic fundamentals, and that there has been no misalignments of 
Pak rupee real exchange rates over the period under investigation. This is because 
Pak rupee real exchange rates have not been seen to be reverting to their long-run 
(PPP) values over time, and hence have become unstable, indicating the presence of 
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substantial and prolonged deviations from conventional PPP which are often 
interpreted as causing misalignments of real exchange rates.8 This evidence, of 
course, is not sufficient to support if Pak rupee real exchanges have been moving in 
line with their economic fundamentals. This has been done more formally and 
rigorously by Haque and Montiel (1992); Chishti and Hasan (1993); Afridi (1995); 
and Siddiqui et al. (1996), who conducted empirical tests to explore economic 
fundamentals determining Pak rupee real exchange rate or Pak rupee real effective 
exchange rate. Most of these studies define and model Pak rupee real exchange rate 
on the lines followed by Edwards (1989), who examined determinants as well as 
misalignments of real exchange rates.9 These studies modelled Pak rupee real 
exchange rate by explicitly postulating that the real exchange rate is endogenously 
determined by two broad sets of economic fundamentals: internal as well as external 
economic fundamentals.10 Haque and Montiel (1992) investigated Pakistan’s 
experience of managed floating exchange rate policy over the period 1982–1991, as 
well as future challenges in this regard. To support their views about the behaviour 
of Pak rupee exchange rate, they conducted some empirical tests to identify 
economic  fundamentals  accounting  for  systematic movements  in Pak rupee real  
8[Pilbeam (1992), pp. 270–273.] 
9Researchers have usually used numerous and often contradictory definitions of the real exchange 
rate [see Edwards (1988), pp. 47-48]. Unlike the earliest view based on PPP, which defines the real 
exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the ratio of the domestic to the foreign price 
index, the other definitions view the real exchange rate as the relative price of tradables to non-tradables. 
It is interesting to note that in the former case the real exchange rate is also determined by the ratio of the 
prices of tradables to non-tradables. Assuming that PPP holds for tradables only, the nominal exchange 
rate can be hypothesised to depend on both the relative price and the relative price structure, such that the 
former is determined by monetary factors while the latter is determined by real factors. Therefore, the PPP 
relationship is given by 
])()[()( tNTtNTtt pppppps
∗∗∗ −−−+−=  
where )]()[( ∗∗ −−− NTTT pppp is the relative price structure determined by the ratio of the prices of 
tradables to non-tradables across countries. This equation implies that if monetary conditions are similar, 
the nominal exchange rate will be determined by structural changes, while if the internal price structure 
across countries remains stable, the exchange rate will be determined by relative prices as represented by 
Equation (2). Thus, Equation (2) holds only if shocks are mainly of monetary origin. In contrast, if shocks 
are not mainly of monetary origin, and the relative price structure is not stable over time, then the 
omission of the term )]()[( ∗∗ −−− NTTT pppp , which represents structural changes, makes the PPP model 
misspecified. This is known as Balassa’s (1964) productivity bias hypothesis, which can be tested by 
regressing the real exchange rate on productivity differences across countries [see Bahmani-Oskooee 
(1992)]. This model can be further extended to incorporate both domestic and external variables to 
examine the behaviour of the real exchange rate. 
10It is worth noting that while the equilibrium real exchange rate is determined by real variables 
only, the actual real exchange rate may respond both to real and monetary variables [see, for example, 
Edwards (1988), p. 9]. Consequently, the actual real exchange rate may deviate from its long-run 
equilibrium value, and if these deviations are substantial and persistent, they will cause misalignments of 
the real exchange rate. 
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exchange rate. Regressing the log value of the real effective exchange rate on the log 
values of Pakistan’s external terms of trade, the ratio of remittance receipts plus 
official transfers to GNP, they obtained results showing that the workers’ remittances 
and official reserves, which have in fact provided the bulk of Pakistan’s external 
receipts over the period under study, significantly explain the behaviour of Pak rupee 
real effective exchange rate. These results were interpreted as implying that the 
authorities have been successful in tracking, through nominal exchange rate policy, 
the underlying trend in the equilibrium real effective exchange rate over the period 
under investigation. 
Siddiqui et al. (1996) applied a simultaneous equation system to model the 
behaviour of Pak rupee real exchange rate over the period 1960–94. Employing the 
two-stage least square procedure, they produced results indicating that almost all 
variables, including, inter alia, excess domestic credit, net capital flows (defined as 
the sum of net foreign borrowing, foreign aid, and net income from abroad), and 
technological change, turned out to be factors significantly affecting the behaviour of 
Pak rupee real exchange rate. However, the results showed also that terms of trade 
did not effect the real exchange rate significantly, an evidence which is supportive of 
earlier findings obtained by Haque and Montiel (1992) and Afridi (1995). Based on 
these results, Siddiqui et al. (1996) suggested controlling both monetary and real 
variables together with domestic prices, instead of repeated devaluations, to maintain 
stability in Pak rupee real exchange rate. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has tested the proposition as to whether or not expectations play 
any role in determining three Pak rupee exchange rates: rupee-dollar, rupee-pound, 
and rupee-yen. Results from two residual-based cointegration tests are in line with 
the view that in efficient markets in which uncertainty and expectations about the 
future are present, the nominal exchange rate is determined not only by current 
relative prices but also by the expected real exchange rate. These results lend support 
to ex ante PPP as against conventional PPP. 
The policy implications that can be drawn from these results are as follows. 
First, the inflation rate is expected to be higher in Pakistan than in other countries, 
which in turn is likely to cause depreciation of Pak rupee. Second, the anticipated 
depreciation of Pak rupee is expected to encourage the domestic residents to transfer 
their assets into foreign assets, leading to the flight of capital from Pakistan. Third, 
terms of trade for Pakistan also tend to deteriorate because of a higher anticipated 
inflation rate at home than that abroad. Finally, the tendency to a larger expected 
inflation rate in Pakistan eventually offsets much of the gains from a continuous 
devaluation of Pak rupee by undermining external competitiveness. 
Razzaque H. Bhatti 272 
REFERENCES 
Adler, M., and B. Lehman (1983) Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity in the 
Long Run. Journal of Finance 38: 1471–1487. 
Afridi, U. (1995) Determining Real Exchange Rates. The Pakistan Development 
Review 34:3  263–276. 
Bahmani-Uskooee, M. (1992) A Time Series Approach to the Productivity Bias 
Hypothesis in Purchasing Power Parity. Kyklos 45: 227–36. 
Balassa, B. (1964) The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal. Journal of 
Political Economy 72: 584–596. 
Bhatti, R. H., and I. A. Moosa (1994) A New Approach to Testing Ex Ante 
Purchasing Power Parity. Applied Economics Letters 1: 148–151. 
Cassel, G. (1916) The Present Situation of the Foreign Exchange. Economic Journal 
26: 62–65. 
Chishti, S., and M. A. Hasan (1993) What Determines the Behaviour of Real 
Exchange Rate in Pakistan? The Pakistan Development Review 32:4  1015–
1028. 
Cooper, J. C. B. (1994) Purchasing Power Parity: A Cointegration Analysis of the 
Australian, New Zealand, and Singaporean Currencies. Applied Economics 
Letters 1: 167–171. 
Crowder, W. J. (1992) Purchasing Power Parity over the Modern Float: An 
Application in Higher Order Cointegration. Economics Letters 40: 313–318. 
Dickey, D. A., and W. A. Fuller (1979) Distribution of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 74: 427–431. 
Edwards, S. (1988) Exchange Rate Misalignment in Developing Countries. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Edwards, S. (1989) Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and Adjustment: Exchange 
Rate Policy in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press. 
Engle, R. F., and C. W. J. Granger (1987) Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing. Econometrica 55: 251–276. 
Engle, R. F., and C. W. J. Granger (eds) (1991) Long-run Economic Relationships: 
Readings in Cointegration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fama, E. F. (1970) Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work. Journal of Finance 25: 383–417. 
Flynn, N. A., and J. L. Boucher (1993) Tests of Long-run Purchasing Power Parity 
Using Alternative Methodologies. Journal of Macroeconomics 15: 109–122. 
Frenkel, J. A. (1981) The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parities during the 1970s. 
European Economic Review 16: 145–165. 
Genberg, H. (1978) Purchasing Power Parity under Fixed and Flexible Exchange 
Rates. Journal of International Economics 8: 247–270. 
Expectations and the Pak Rupee Exchange Rate 273 
Haque, N. Ul., and P. J. Montiel (1992) Exchange Rate Policy in Pakistan: Recent 
Experience and Prospects. In A. Nasim (ed) Financing Pakistan’s Development 
in the 1990s. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Moosa, I. A., and R. H. Bhatti (1996) Does Purchasing Power Parity Hold Between 
Japan and Other Asian Countries? Journal of International Economic Studies 
10: 83–92. 
Moosa, I. A., and R. H. Bhatti (1997) Are Asian Markets Integrated? Evidence from 
Six Asian Countries vis-à-vis Japan. International Economic Journal 11: 51–
67. 
Moosa, I. A., and R. H. Bhatti (1997a) International Parity Conditions: Theory, 
Econometric Testing, and Empirical Evidence. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Nachane, D. M., and A. Chrissanthaki (1991) Purchasing Power Parity in the Short 
and Long Run: A Reappraisal of the Post-1973 Evidence. Applied Economics 
23: 1257–1268. 
Patel, J. (1990) Purchasing Power Parity as a Long-run Relation. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 5: 367–379. 
Phillips, P. C. B., and S. Ouliaris (1990) Asymptotic Properties of Residual-based 
Tests for Cointegration. Econometrica 58: 165–193. 
Pilbeam, K. (1992) International Finance. London: Macmillan Educational Ltd. 
Roll, R. (1979) Violations of Purchasing Power Parity and Their Implications for 
Efficient International Commodity Markets. In M. Sarnat and G. P. Szego (eds) 
International Finance and Trade. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger. 
Serletis, A. (1994) Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Tests of Purchasing Power 
Parity: Evidence from Seventeen OECD Countries. Weltwirtschafliches Archiv 
130: 476–491. 
Siddiqui, R., U. Afridi, and Z. Mahmood (1996) Exchange Rate Determination in 
Pakistan: A Simultaneous Equation Model. The Pakistan Development Review 
35:4  682–690. 
Stock, J. H. (1987) Asymptotic Properties of Least Square Estimates of 
Cointegrating Vectors. Econometrica 55: 1035–1056. 
Taylor, M. P. (1988) An Empirical Examination of Long-run Purchasing Power 
Parity Using Cointegration Techniques. Applied Economics 20: 1369–1381. 
West, K. D. (1988) Asymptotic Normality When Regressors Have a Unit Root. 
Econometrica 56: 1397–1418. 
 
